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Introduction

Introduction:
Symposium on the Law
and Politics of Foreign
Investment
David Sloss∗

On February 1-2, 2013, Santa Clara University School of Law hosted a conference on
the law and politics of foreign investment. The conference included a keynote address by
Rudolf Dolzer; four main papers by Roger Alford, August Reinisch, Catherine Rogers, and
Jason Yackee; and commentaries on those four papers by a distinguished group of
scholars and practitioners. This symposium issue of the Journal includes revised versions
of the papers presented at that conference.
Professor Dolzer’s paper presents a masterful summary of the current state of the fair
and equitable treatment (FET) standard in international investment law.1 He focuses on
the question whether application of the FET standard by arbitral tribunals “has matured
enough to make it manageable on the operational level so that it is justified to speak of a
legally distinct, manageable rule available for practical purposes of investment
arbitration.”2 He answers this question in the affirmative, showing that arbitral
jurisprudence has identified “groups and clusters of subgroups with more defined
contours” that help to operationalize the FET standard.3 His analysis focuses primarily
on the concept of legitimate expectations. While acknowledging that the FET standard
encompasses more than just legitimate expectations, he argues that “[t]he protection of
legitimate expectations [of investors] . . . [is] the central pillar in the understanding and
application of the FET standard.”4 Professor Dolzer identifies seven distinct elements of
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the concept of legitimate expectations that tribunals have applied to put flesh on the
skeleton of the FET standard. He contends that arbitral practice, by identifying “a
number of rationally manageable subcategories,” has confirmed “the usefulness and the
operational manageability of the” FET standard.5
Roger Alford’s insightful and thought-provoking paper identifies five key areas where
international trade and investment law are converging.6 First, he discusses the trend
toward incorporating trade and investment provisions into a single treaty.7 Second, he
analyzes “the converging commitments in trade and investment arbitration against
protectionism and discrimination.”8 Third, he addresses situations where a single
underlying dispute gives rise to dispute settlement procedures in both the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and investment treaty arbitration.9 Fourth, he discusses the use of
trade remedies to enforce arbitration awards.10 Finally, he addresses the potential future
use of investment treaty arbitration to enforce international trade rules.11 The overall
picture is one of increasing overlap between two distinct bodies of international economic
law.
Andrea Bjorklund’s commentary largely accepts Professor Alford’s descriptive account
of the convergence between trade and investment law.12 Her paper offers some tentative
thoughts about the potential costs and benefits of convergence. Ideally, she hopes, “one
might see the development of complementary regimes such that each works to provide
redress for the matters that it is most suited to handle.”13 However, she cautions, “[t]here
is some danger that convergence in the trade and investment regimes simply exacerbates
the already existing imbalance between powerful and less powerful actors in the
international regime.”14
Todd Weiler’s commentary on Alford’s paper takes a different approach.15 Weiler
contends that Alford’s analysis of anti-discrimination norms overlooks the nineteenth
century roots of modern international economic law. Weiler’s fascinating historical
analysis contends that rules governing most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) and
national treatment (NT) converged in the middle of the nineteenth century into a single
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“treatment no less favorable” (TNLF) standard.16 Later, in the twentieth century,
international trade and international investment law diverged into two separate legal
regimes. Thus, he contends, in the modern era “we are not dealing with convergence, but
rather re-convergence.”17 He closes with a plea not to “confuse our understanding of how
NT works in the [trade] context for how TNLF works (or ought to work) in the” context of
international investment law.18
August Reinisch’s paper presents a detailed assessment of various issues related to
the future of European investment law.19 His starting point is the Treaty of Lisbon,
concluded in 2007, which transferred at least partial responsibility for negotiating and
implementing international investment treaties from individual Member States to the
European Union (EU).20 The treaty has sparked a lively debate within Europe concerning
the division of competence between the EU and its Member States. It has also sparked a
debate among the main EU organs – the European Parliament, the Commission, and the
Council – regarding the preferred future direction of EU investment policy.21 Professor
Reinisch’s task is complicated by the fact that he takes aim at a rapidly moving target.
Even so, he does a masterful job of mapping out the complex substantive and
organizational issues at stake, and offers some tentative predictions about the likely
future resolution of key issues.
Mark Clodfelter’s commentary takes a provocative stand on three discrete issues
raised in Professor Reinisch’s paper.22 First, Clodfelter contends that recent evidence
points to “standards emerging from EU action that will diverge greatly from the more
open-ended language of contemporary Member State BITs, and more closely resemble
those adopted by the North American states.”23 Second, he argues that the European
Parliament “has strongly signaled that ISDS [investor-state dispute settlement] is not to
be considered an indispensable element of investment protection . . . the US-Australia
solution of dispensing with ISDS altogether is a real option for the EU.”24 Third, he
claims there are “compelling” arguments for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to
invalidate existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between EU Member States on
the ground that they violate fundamental provisions of EU law.25
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Julie Maupin’s commentary raises two fundamental questions about the future of EU
investment law.26 First, she asks, “where should European investment policy go next?”27
She recommends “a robust normative debate to clarify the end goals of a shared EU
international investment policy,”28 and continued dialogue “that generates some
mutually agreed means of either balancing or prioritizing among . . . competing policy
visions.”29 Second, she presents an insightful analysis of the comparative institutional
strengths and weaknesses of the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Commission, and the European Court of Justice in shaping the future direction of
European investment law and policy. She claims that “[t]he structural checks and
balances which the Lisbon Treaty imposes upon each institution’s competencies in the
investment arena effectively prohibits any one institution from moving forward without
getting the others on board.”30 Praising the system of checks and balances, she concludes
by speculating that “the Lisbon Treaty may one day be regarded as the dawn . . . of a
more democratic international investment law system.”31
Catherine Rogers’ paper evaluates the current state of empirical research on the
arbitrators who decide international investment disputes.32 Part One of her paper
acknowledges the value of empirical research, but warns that such research “must be
read, interpreted, and relied on only with a full understanding of its limitations.”33 She
then presents an insightful analysis of those limitations, focusing on four primary
methodological challenges for empirical research on investment treaty arbitrators.34 Part
Two addresses two specific reform proposals that are based, at least partly, on empirical
research. Rogers’ analysis highlights “the risks of linking empirical research to specific
reform proposals.”35 Part Three offers several recommendations for improving future
empirical research about investment treaty arbitrators.36
Chiara Giorgetti’s commentary on Professor Rogers’ paper contends that empirical
research is most useful “when a question that can only have a yes/no answer is posited
and objective criteria are evaluated.”37 She evaluates available data on diversity to show
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that the group of people who serve as arbitrators in investment disputes manifests a
troubling lack of geographical and gender diversity.38 Based on that data, she offers
several proposals for enhancing the geographical and gender diversity of investment
treaty arbitrators.39
Jason Yackee’s paper contends that social scientists engaged in empirical analysis of
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have much to gain by collaborating with legal
academics.40 He acknowledges that the plea for greater collaboration between lawyers
and social scientists is nothing new. However, he notes, others have assumed that “the
benefits of collaboration . . . flow in a single direction – from the methodologically welltrained social scientist to the methodologically naïve or illiterate legal scholar.”41 He
argues that benefits can flow in the other direction also. He supports this claim by
presenting a critique of a particular empirical study of BITs performed by two political
scientists, showing how the study would have benefited from greater legal expertise.42 He
then presents an alternative model for analyzing investor-state dispute settlement
clauses in BITs that incorporates a lawyer’s perspective.43
In her commentary on Professor Yackee’s paper, Catherine Amirfar offers the
perspective of a practitioner with extensive experience in investor-state arbitration.44 She
endorses Yackee’s claim that empirical studies “can be much improved through greater
interdisciplinary collaboration between lawyers and social scientists.”45 However, she
adds, “the search for expertise should not be limited to the legal academy . . . it should
encompass practitioners as well.”46 Drawing on her own experience, she challenges
Yackee’s rank ordering of different types of investor-state dispute settlement clauses and
presents an alternative ordering that, in her view, better reflects the reality of investorstate arbitration.47
Sergio Puig’s commentary on Professor Yackee’s paper approaches the topic from a
different angle.48 Like Amirfar, he endorses Yackee’s “call for more empirical and
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interdisciplinary research in the field of international investment law.”49 However, he
gently criticizes Yackee’s exclusive focus on quantitative analysis. “Quants are only part
of the empirical legal community . . . Qualitative empirical research is as valuable as
quantitative research, and provides possibilities for giving rich context to legal
behavior.”50
Overall, the papers in this symposium make a valuable contribution to the burgeoning
body of scholarship on international investment law. Hopefully, this brief introduction
has whetted the reader’s appetite for more. Both novices and experts stand to learn a
good deal by reading the entire volume.
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